El Salvador
Three Years of Arena Presidency
Envío team
On June 1, Alfredo Cristiani marked three years in his presidential term, having presided over two fundamental achievements for his country: the peace process and economic recovery. These considerable achievements, however, also represent two serious targets for attacks from different quarters.
In general, both his own party ARENA (with exceptions) and the opposition recognize Cristiani's valuable efforts in the negotiation process. Without his personal presence at crucial moments, the process could have been either temporarily or definitively stalled.
Yet the sharpest criticisms of Cristiani's term come precisely from those who were, until December 1991, his most ardent defenders: the recalcitrant right wing and the army, both of whom see his signing of the peace accords, particularly what they term the "imposition" of the Chapultepec accords, as nothing less than betrayal. While the extreme right has not directly attacked President Cristiani to date, there has been no shortage of anonymous charges against the "vacillations" of ARENA and the private business association ANEP.
This explains the scant publicity afforded the celebration of Cristiani's three years and his speech on that occasion. In his June 1 speech, Cristiani criticized the far right for being "wedded to obsolete and failed models that created chaos, corruption and poverty and benefited a privileged few at the cost of an entire nation."
Cristiani will have to contend with the political discontent of the right wing, as no internal shifts are foreseen in either ARENA or the rest of the right before the 1994 elections. For all that, the right has no problems with the neoliberal economic programs the government is promoting. If there is one thing the Right lauds, supports and demands, it is precisely that the government promote economic policies aimed at freeing up the market and privatizing those economic sectors in state hands. However, it is on this point that Cristiani has his greatest problems with the opposition.
The government is proud of having reduced inflation—from 25% in the 1985-88 period to 9.8% in 1991, according to its own data; posting a growth rate of 3.5%; and reducing unemployment to the point that government economists call the situation one of "virtually full employment" which even leaves a labor shortage during the key harvest periods. But only very specific sectors of the population are benefited by this apparent reality. In looking just at the governmental statistics, it is virtually impossible to imagine, much less understand the drastically deteriorating living conditions of the poorest of the poor.
It is on this issue that the political opposition and the popular organizations reaffirm their critical role toward a government dedicated to the free market at all costs. The opposition's fundamental problem, however, is that it has no alternative economic plan to offer the population. This is recognized by a range of opposition parties from the FMLN to the PDC, and is reflected in the weak treatment given economic issues in the Chapultepec accords. Certain mechanisms are proposed to deal with both concertación (a forum to hammer out agreements on compensatory social programs) and land redistribution and credit, but even this is only for demobilizing combatants. The government's overall economic plan was not discussed. It continues full steam ahead and all that can be done is to defray its costs with programs to cushion the economic blows to the poorest sectors.
Politically, the opposition is in an advantageous position. ARENA has to play the role of hard cop, while the opposition is left to staunchly defend the population. This could mean points in the latter's favor for the 1994 elections, but ARENA could still maneuver to its political advantage, through more programs such as the Fund for Social Investment.
Labor strife During June, the teachers grouped together in the Salvadoran Teachers' Front (FMS) began talks with the government to layout their economic demands. Differences between ANDES (the largest teachers' organization with a longstanding tradition of struggle) and the rest of the organizations in the FMS led to a situation in which ANDES called for a national work stoppage (underway for more than two weeks at this writing) while the others were making pacts with the Ministry of Education around salary issues. This confusing panorama soon included teachers engaging in a hunger strike to denounce the FMS' lack of representativity in its negotiations with the Ministry. In response to the government's refusal to deal with ANDES, more than 70,000 state workers carried out a successful stoppage that both supported ANDES and put the workers' own demands on the table.
Cristiani, however, will continue to underscore his government's two achievements of peace and economic recovery, despite recalcitrance from the far right around the first issue and criticism from the opposition around the second.
New push to the peace process The peace process received new impetus in the wake of the private meetings held by a tripartite commission made up of the government (headed by Cristiani himself), the FMLN and ONUSAL, the United Nations' peacekeeping force in El Salvador. After innumerable violations and delays in compliance with the accords, and given the imminent crisis facing the entire peace process, ONUSAL promoted these direct and private meetings between the different parties.
Backing for the meetings came from the UN Security Council when Boutros-Ghali informed it that delays in compliance were tending to "undermine the confidence of both parties." From that emerged the Security Council's call to both parties to comply with the accords fully and immediately, given that any protraction of the virtual impasse would put the very foundation of the accords in danger. Both parties responded to the Security Council's call by committing themselves to respect the calendar spelled out for compliance. Another response was the distribution of ONUSAL's first political report.
The ONUSAL report, which was not circulated very widely, cleared up doubts related to points of noncompliance on the part of both parties to the accords. The government was most affected and most upset by the report, since its official line had been that it was strictly complying with the accords, essentially throwing the blame for the crisis of the peace process back into the FMLN's court.
It was true that the FMLN had not concentrated all its military forces into the designated zones, nor had it demobilized the 40% of its forces corresponding to the months of May and June as spelled out by the accords. The ONUSAL report notes this. Nevertheless, the same report recognizes that the army had not concentrated all its forces into the appropriate zones (despite repeated claims that it had) and that the ongoing presence of the ex-National Guard and ex-Treasury Police in their respective bunkers is completely contrary to the spirit of the accords—as is the executive decree attempting to maintain the structure of these military corps, contradicting what both the government and the armed forces publicly say. Along with these cases of noncompliance, the report also calls attention to the delay in compliance with other accords established by the calendar, including the restructuring of the new police force and the legalization of the FMLN as a political party.
Thus, in the end, there was no alternative other than drawing up a new calendar, always with the final goal of finishing the process by October 31. In this way, both parties committed themselves to definitively concentrating their troops in their positions. The government agreed to leave the Treasury Police installations, and the FMLN said it would demobilize 20% of its military forces on June 30.
The US role As part of its ongoing role, the US Congress invited a delegation to report on the development and compliance of the accords. The delegation included FMLN comandante Joaquín Villalobos, who entered the US this time without visa problems; Ernesto Altshul, former USAID collaborator and currently director of the Secretariat of Communications; and Rubén Zamora of the Democratic Convergence. Each gave his point of view about the process, its limitations, advances and difficulties.
One of the two issues linked to Congressional activity on El Salvador has been the petition to Secretary of State James Baker by a group of representatives, led by Joe Moakley, for more information—both classified and unclassified—pertaining to the Commission of Truth. This commission, formed by Belisario Betancourt, Reinaldo Figueredo and Thomas Buergenthal, is charged with clarifying the gravest violations of human rights during the war. The Moakley group also requested information from the "Ad Hoc" Commission that is evaluating the personnel files of all armed forces officials as a preliminary step to purging the army. The other issue has been the delay in US financial assistance to the country, including funds earmarked for reconstruction. Congress would be interested in a closer look at the peace process, the current situation of the armed forces and the government's involvement in ongoing environmental damage in the country.
REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL
The report to the UN Security Council by the secretary General touches on three kinds of problems in complying with the accords.
1. Delays: in general, due to logistical reasons, financial limitations, policies, or claims of simultaneity. Among such problems are the following:
1.1. The separation of military forces—that is, the separation of the Army and nearly 3,500 members of the Treasury Police and the National Guard from the FMLN (8% of the total force.)
1.2. The process of legalizing the FMLN as a political party.
2. Problems related to different interpretations of the accords by the two parties:
2.1. the legalization and transference of lands in conflictive zones: this social-economic theme has many ambiguities, for example, the definition of “zones of conflict.” This point caused difficulties in the installation of the concertación forum.
3. Execution of accords contrary to the spirit of the accords:
3.1. the report considers as incompatible with the accords the interpretation and execution of the agreements specifically regarding the suppression of the security forces. This is due both to the permanence of their organic structure and their continuation in points not designated for concentration of the army, and to the transfer of members of these corps to the National Police.
Points of greatest concern
1. The problem emerging around the discontinuation of the former security forces.
2. The delay in the concentration of armed elements pertaining to both parties.
3. The report expresses its doubt regarding the quantity, quality and age of the arms reported to be in the FMLN’s possession. The alleged incongruence generates a “destabilizing effect” on the process.
4. The lack of facilities for incorporating ex-FMLN combatants into civilian life: in relation to this, the inoperativeness of the Public Security Academy (which would permit the entrance of former guerillas into the new police forces), the delay in the legalization of the FMLN and the ongoing agrarian problem.
5. The restoration of public administration in municipalities affected by the war: to date, only 24 of 68 municipalities have reestablished public administration.
Inexorable compliance? The process thus would seem to be saved: there is a new impetus towards peace. The difficulties in compliance with the accords have been clear since the signing. Nevertheless, ONUSAL's work in the country as well as the recovery of the international variable—basically, the demand by the UN Secretary General and Security Council that the accords be fulfilled in their totality by October 31—proved to be essential to overcoming the stalemate in the peace process.
Prospects for the 1994 elections: The participants and their profiles The emergence of the FMLN into the country's open political life has generated a regrouping process among the existing political parties. New parties, such as the Movement of National Solidarity (MSN), have already appeared and more will certainly come.
ARENA: founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson as an extreme rightwing party, of a clear anti-communist and nationalist profile. Initially it was linked to fascist thinking and its leaders were tied to the death squads, but after D'Aubuisson lost the 1984 presidential elections, it moved towards more pragmatic and civilized positions—a moderate right wing, represented by Alfredo Cristiani. Two tendencies within the party can be identified: Cristiani's moderate, pragmatic sector; and another closely identified with the extreme right and the late D'Aubuisson. The fundamental problem facing ARENA for the 1994 elections consists of assuring support not only from the sectors negatively affected by the economic plan, but also from those middle class sectors who see the peace accords with the FMLN as negative.
MSN: founded in 1991 and currently in the process of obtaining legal status from the Supreme Electoral Council. The MSN is the party of the evangelical sectors thought to be clandestinely financed by D'Aubuisson's extreme right as a rightwing alternative to ARENA. The MSN puts forth a center-right discourse criticizing primarily the Left, but also the right wing and the traditional political parties. About 17% of the country's population identifies themselves as evangelical.
PDC: Founded in the early 1960s, the Christian Democratic Party formed coalitions during the 1970s with the left (MNR and UDN), in an attempt to take power. It was part of the third government junta (1980) and began to commit itself increasingly to the military and the US government. The war as well as corruption within the party and the state wore away at its electoral base, and it lost both the presidency and the majority in the National Assembly. It sees itself as a party of the center and of the middle class. It has introduced an opposition discourse that looks to base itself in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church.
MAC: The Authentic Christian Movement is a rightwing splinter from the PDC, separated fundamentally by the rivalry between Rey Prendes and Chávez Mena in the 1989 presidential elections. The MAC is recognized as faithfully making pacts with ARENA. Since its foundation, its percentage in the polls has gone steadily down. It currently has only one representative in the Legislative Assembly.
PCN: The Party of National Conciliation survived the coup that toppled General Romero in 1979. Since its foundation in 1961, it maintained the presidency until 1979 through the presence of four different military figures. During the 1980s, it attempted to move toward more centrist positions, but was dominated by the party's traditional wing. Although it tries to be an independent rightwing party, it maintains a faithful relationship with ARENA. It came in third in the last elections, after ARENA and the PDC. Its aim is to pull the votes of the traditional right.
Democratic Convergence: a coalition of three parties with Social Christian tendencies: the Popular Social Christian Movement, MPSC, a left split from the PDC in 1979, social democratic; the National Revolutionary Movement, MNR, founded in the 1960s; and the Social Democratic Party, PSD, founded around 1988. It represented the Left, for the first time during the war, in the 1989 elections, taking fourth place, after the PCN. Supposedly, personal rivalries and the interest in the growing independence between the MNR, led by Victor Valle, and the MPSC, led by Rubén Zamora, has sent the coalition into crisis.
UDN: The National Democratic Union is the legal instrument for political participation of the Communist Party through 1992. It elected one representative to the Assembly in the 1991 elections.
FMLN: Front founded in October 1980 by five revolutionary organizations: the Salvadoran Communist Party, PCS (1930); the Popular Liberation Forces, FPL (1970); the Revolutionary Army of the People, ERP (1971); the National Resistance, RN (1975); and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, PRTC (1976). After fighting a war for twelve years, the FMLN is facing elections for the first time. It has said repeatedly that it does not aspire to the presidency in 1994, and is willing to work with a broad alliance in opposition to ARENA. Its fundamental problem is the method of articulating unity among the diverse groups making up the coalition. Unity, as a political front, would seem to be more cohesive in the wake of the peace accords. However, there may well be a tendency that considers that the FMLN, as a front, has already fulfilled its role and therefore must construct new mechanisms by which to advance a strategy of broader alliances. (See interview with Gerson Martínez, member of the FMLN Political Commission, in this issue's Update section.)
Electoral strategies To date, two public opinion surveys have been carried out regarding the 1994 elections. While ARENA has one of the best public research teams, it has not made public the results of any of their work in monitoring the media and conducting polls. The statistics presented here come from public opinion polls done by IUDOP-UCA in February 1992 and published in April 1992. The MPSC also carried out a poll between April and May, which largely coincides with the IUDOP-UCA results.
Analysis of the results Given that the elections are still far away, the polls only represent initial tendencies of the electorate's preferences.
It is a fact that ARENA has a solid base of party activists, both because it is the party in power, and because of its impressive propaganda apparatus. The other parties demonstrated relatively unconditional loyalty on the part of their supporters and members. The more than 40% of the respondents who said they did not know their preference thus constitute the main terrain for ongoing party activity.
The percentages received by the opposition parties are close to the most recent electoral results; the only real variation is that the PCN has lost support. The low results obtained by the FMLN contrast sharply with its capacity to develop a guerrilla army and wage a war for some 12 years. Nevertheless, this can be understood as part of the transition process from clandestinity to legality. The most recent FMLN party demonstrations, both nationally and departmentally, point to a discreet move out of clandestinity. Obviously, nothing definitive regarding broad popular support for the FMLN can be concluded from the poll results or from its demonstrations. This is, in fact, precisely what the FMLN will put to test in the 1994 elections.
The political tendencies indicate a certain predisposition towards forming broad coalitions. In case of a close contest by ARENA (21.3%), the creation of an opposition front (6.4% + 5.3%+ 4.3% + 0.5%) fosters hopes of defeating ARENA if it can pull down enough of the undecided votes.
Alliance strategiesARENA is preparing itself for a direct confrontation with the left opposition. It must also take on the discontent of the popular sectors that voted for ARENA with the hope of economic improvement, as well as the discontent of the rightwing sectors due to the signing of the peace accords. An alliance with the PCN and the MAC could be a coherent strategy in a polarized electoral context. Yet the PCN and MAC both have reservations about such an alliance. ARENA's strategy centers on recouping the rightwing votes, but that is in the hands of the MSN and represents primarily rightwing voters disenchanted with ARENA's economic policies.
Diverse alternatives within the opposition have been presented, but there is agreement that only with a broad coalition will it be possible to defeat ARENA in the coming elections. The differences revolve around internal leadership of the coalition. In principle, the FMLN has announced that it will not field its own candidates for the presidency and that it will support a broad opposition coalition.
From the PDC's perspective, leadership of the coalition as well as the presidential candidate should rest with it, because it is the opposition party with the greatest number of votes and the largest representation in the Assembly. The program would meet with relative acceptance among the rest of the parties, in terms of being a minimum program modifiable through negotiation during the process of constructing an alliance.
To the MNR, the important opposition parties are the PDC, the FMLN and the MNR, and they feel that the forging of a broad center-left alliance should be based on these three groups. The presidential candidate and leadership of the coalition would be relatively secondary and negotiable.
The FMLN's RN takes essentially the same line, searching for the broadest possible coalition of forces, including private enterprise, with an independent presidential candidate. The RN leans toward the candidate being a progressive private business leader.
If a coalition of this type is indeed possible, it will face at least three difficulties. One is the PDC's possible unwillingness to cede what it considers its rightful privilege to name the presidential candidate. Another is that a broad coalition would, in principle, force the right wing to group together around ARENA, strengthening its electoral possibilities. There is also the fact that a coalition of this type, which includes the PDC, would provoke distrust by the popular sectors in the left parties, as it would mean allying with the party that from 1980-88 made a pact with the army and served as a facade for the US government's counterinsurgency strategy in the country.
The third route, proposed by the MPSC, attempts to avoid these dangers. According to this vision, the coalition should be formed first by the leftwing parties (MPSC, MNR, PSD, UDN and FMLN), and should participate in the elections independently of the PDC, but working with a gentleman's pact. The theory behind this is that none of the parties or coalitions would reach the majority needed for victory in the first round of elections, and a second round would have be called. The pact, premised on the results of the first round, would commit the force receiving fewer votes to support the other in the second round. This would protect the left from a direct initial link to the PDC, and avoid a debate about leadership in a broad coalition. Pending issues would be who leads the left coalition in the first round—particularly given the differences between the MNR and the MPSC—as well as dissuading the RN from its idea of forming the broadest coalition possible.
At root, however, the main problem to be resolved has to do with how to imagine unity within the left, both in the FMLN and in the Democratic Convergence.
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