Envío Digital
 
Central American University - UCA  
  Number 145 | Agosto 1993

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El Salvador

Repercussions of the Managua Arms Cache

The FMLN should take very seriously the error it committed, recognized it and provide explanations to the people. If not, it might already be on the way to losing the next elections. Today the left is divided and weak, the right is encouraged and enlivened and the center is ... empty.

Omar Serrano

The partial explosion of an arms arsenal in Managua that some say was no accident, and the discovery that it belonged to the Popular Liberation Front (FPL), a member organization of the FMLN, has denoted the former guerrilla movement's most difficult moment since the peace accords were signed in January 1992.

The principal actors in the peace process traded roles: the FMLN was put in the hot seat for non compliance with the accords, and the government and army were the "chaste" ones. This role reversal enabled the latter to cover over their own many failures to comply, something the correlation of forces in previous months had not allowed them to do.

The discovery of the arms cache also provoked further fissures within the FMLN, at least in the short run, as well as sparking United Nations censure and the distrust of the international community and some sectors of the population.

FMLN: Divided and Lethargic

When the scandal erupted, the first reaction of Facundo Guardado, the FPL's candidate for vice president of the Republic, was to attribute his organization's responsibility for the arsenal to pure speculation. But within only a few days, the results of a joint investigation by Managua authorities, the UN observer mission ONUSAL and members of El Salvador's Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) pitched Guardado's statements out the window. The arsenal really was FPL property and, in fact, was not the only one. Four additional FPL arms caches were found and destroyed in different locations in Nicaraguan territory.

"We never imagined the consequences that hiding a few arms would have," Guardado told the national press. When a journalist asked if the Supreme Electoral Tribunal could sanction the FMLN for being an "armed party," which is prohibited by the electoral code, Guardado responded with the characteristic arrogance of Salvadoran soldiers: he disparaged the arsenal's importance and warned the government that sanctioning the FMLN would have unforeseeable consequences. This response engendered disapproval and desperation among some sectors of the population. Was the left not going to differentiate itself from those who have traditionally boasted power? The international community also looked upon the FMLN with distrust.

More conflicts within the FMLN also came to light. The organization led by Joaquín Villalobos which in its recent congress changed its name from the People's Revolutionary Army to the People's Expression of Renewal (both with the acronym ERP) was the first to react. Villalobos asserted that the FMLN is made up of five groups and that the failures of one should not be attributed to all. "It does not represent non compliance by the FMLN but by one of its organizations," he said.

An ERP communiqué accused the FPL leadership of being "liars" as well as "guilty." It is important to remember that the ERP was the only one of the five organizations mentioned directly in the Truth Commission report, which recommended that its top level leaders, including Villalobos, abstain from occupying political posts. The ERP communiqué stated that history has revealed "who are the truly guilty" of the FMLN, thus attempting to belittle the Truth Commission's assertions. The FPL and ERP have headed up the two perspectives that have "divided" the revolutionary movement since the signing of peace.

The most notable aspect of the FMLN position after the arsenal's discovery was not its lack of unity but its passivity. Its leaders put their tails between their legs when hit with an avalanche of accusations from the government, army and media allies, without sufficiently reminding these accusers of their own repeated non compliance with the accords. This attitude facilitated new acts of government non compliance.

The Biggest Winners

The governing party and the army have reacted in diverse ways, but always along the same line: capitalizing on the incident to lay the ground for the electoral campaign.

Although ARENA blamed the FPL from the outset, it targeted its accusations at vice presidential candidate Guardado (the name of FPL Secretary General Leonel González never appeared in any pro government news articles about the issue). In a more recent political satire called "Arenillas," the governing party also repeatedly made Democratic Convergence leader Rubén Zamora (who had just been chosen as presidential candidate on a ticket with Guardado) appear as the person directly responsible for the illegal possession of the discovered arms. And ARENA mouthpiece El Diario de Hoy now refers to the FMLN as the FMLN FDR. (Zamora was a leader of the FDR, a party coalition allied with the FMLN during the early war years.) The intent, of course, is to peg these two candidates in the population's mind as those ultimately responsible for such a serious act of non compliance as the arsenal represents.

The government's international strategy has also been to discredit the FMLN and provoke suspicion toward it among the governments of countries supporting the peace process. Since documents were found in the Managua arsenal from the armed Basque organization ETA as well as a vast number of documents revealing plans to kidnap wealthy Latin American mostly Mexican businesspeople, the government has particularly emphasized this still obscure aspect of the cache's contents.

"It wouldn't surprise me if the Salvadoran guerrillas had joint plans to carry out actions with ETA. These terrorists always work together in any part of the world," President Cristiani declared on two different occasions, even though there is no proof that directly links the FMLN to ETA.

Spain and Mexico are two of the four countries that make up the UN Secretary General's Group of Friendly Nations those that have most strongly pressured for total fulfillment of the accords and have collaborated in their verification. Linking the FMLN with ETA and presenting it as a collaborator in plans to kidnap Mexican businesspeople could endanger the support these two countries are still providing to the democratization of Salvadoran society and the excellent relations that both governments have maintained with the FMLN. That, of course, is exactly what the Salvadoran government wants.

The FMLN categorically denied any ties to ETA or to the kidnapping plans and established direct communication with both governments to clarify its own position.

Who Isn't Complying?

The Managua discovery obviously represents serious FMLN non compliance with the peace accords, but the government and armed forces have used the opportunity to do more than discredit the FMLN. They have taken advantage of the moment to carry out actions clearly contrary to the peace accords, on top of their prior failures to comply, such as with agreements on land transfers and Ad Hoc and Truth Commission recommendations, among others.

For example, the government took advantage of both the arms cache and the FMLN's passivity to violate two agreed on points regarding to the National Civil Police (PNC). First, Cristiani named Captain Oscar Peña Durán as PNC deputy director his intention to do so was apparent months ago, but he had been unable to actually pull it off. The peace accords clearly stipulate that the new PNC should be composed of people who are honest and able to adapt to the country's new democratic situation; that the new police institution should be "civilian" and thus independent of army soldiers; and that everyone joining its ranks should be exhaustively evaluated prior to doing so. None of this is true for Peña Durán. "Captain Peña Durán has asked to be discharged from the army and is therefore a civilian joining the new police force," was President Cristiani's only justification. This argument is barely short of ridiculous, particularly since the Salvadoran Constitution establishes that a soldier retains his or her rank even after leaving the army, and can only lose it by being expelled for disciplinary reasons. That is not Peña Durán's case.

The government's second failure to comply relates to the PNC's territorial deployment. The accord programmed that a new station would be established in July in the Santa Ana district, one of the country's most important areas of population and trade. The PNC is already operating in Chalatenango, Cabañas and Morazán. The Cristiani government decided to substitute the La Unión district for Santa Ana, professing reasons of convenience in the PNC's deployment from west to east.

According to FMLN sources, it was an achievement in the negotiations to win the government's concession that Santa Ana be the fourth district to be covered, since the PNC's deployment is a key factor in the March 1994 elections. In the districts the PNC already covers, the people's attitude toward the new agents of public order is very different than it is toward the now dissolved security forces of the National Guard and Treasury Police and the still existing National Police. Though a safe climate is fundamental for the participation of all Salvadorans in the elections, the government appears to prefer that the new PNC not be present in the districts with the most potential votes, because the population would then feel freer to vote for those that the old National Police still see as subversives and enemies.

The government's maneuvers to alter the agreed upon deployment order does not respond to administrative or practical concerns, but to its resistance to the transformation of Salvadoran society and its desire to assure that future elections favor the governing party, which would allow that transformation to be stopped in its tracks.

Military pressure is also behind Cristiani's actions. All Salvadorans know that dismissing Ponce, Zepeda and other high level officers of the "Tandona" was part of fulfilling the accords, that they had to be purged due to their history of human rights violations. But their departure was delayed and camouflaged publicized as responding to their having "completed 30 years of service."
Ponce was replaced by Colonel Humberto Corado, who, in an homage to his predecessor and Zepeda, stated that both had served their country, in his judgment, in exemplary form. Grassroots and human rights organizations screamed to high heaven at the naming of Corado. "They're just changing the clothes on the same old monkey," they said, emphasizing that the government is trying to maintain the power and impunity the military has enjoyed for the past 60 years. Even the Salvadoran Industrialists Association's president claimed that it was time for a civilian to head the Defense Ministry, to begin to make a basic principle of the accords subordinating the military to civilian power a reality.

Colonel Corado's appointment leaves open the question as to whether this decision obeyed only the pressure of the military, or that Cristiani also needs him in this post for his party's future, whether or not it wins the elections.

International Distrust?

Things also went unfavorably for the FMLN internationally after the Managua arsenal discovery. The UN Security Council strongly condemned the former guerrilla organization and demanded that it present a true inventory of all arms still in its power as quickly as possible, so they could be destroyed as the accords established. The FMLN then made a confidential proposal to the UN in which it promised to present that inventory in a determined time period and stipulated the steps to be followed in turning over and destroying the arms. According to FMLN Secretary General Shafick Handal, ONUSAL will be in charge of giving an account of FMLN compliance to the Salvadoran people.

Handal also said that all of the steps will be taken confidentially, to avoid the government manipulation and speculation that has characterized its behavior since the arsenal was discovered. For example, while the UN called the arsenal "the FMLN's most serious violation of the peace accords," the government and affiliated media continue to refer to it as "the most serious violation of the accords," ignoring all incidents of governmental non compliance.

Another event that must be included in this unfavorable period for the FMLN, though unrelated to the arms discovery, is the naming of the new ONUSAL head. The Colombian Augusto Ramírez Ocampo recently replaced Pakistani Iqbal Riza in this important post. It was apparent in just a few short days that the new ONUSAL head has a very different perspective than his predecessor regarding the issues at play in the Salvadoran peace process.
One participant in a "National Reality" forum sponsored by the Central American University asked Ocampo what he felt was the fundamental goal of the Chapultepec accords. "The demobilization and disarmament of the FMLN," he responded, without a moment's hesitation, ignoring the country's democratization or the establishment of justice and an authentic state of law, which will put an end to the impunity of both the military and those who unlawfully abuse the legal system.

The new ONUSAL director's arguments are the same as those of ARENA and the armed forces in the years prior to the signing of the accords. Since it is ONUSAL's task to verify fulfillment of the peace accords, this position, coming from its highest level leader, could affect the future and hopes of all Salvadorans, not just those who sympathize with the FMLN.

The US Applied the Most Pressure

Throughout the peace process, the US has had the greatest leverage in forcing the government and military to yield in the fulfillment of the accords. The arsenal's discovery has not affected this, and it looks as though the situation will be resolved through bilateral agreements between the FMLN and the US government. In declarations to the press, Peter Romero, the acting US ambassador, said that talks with the FMLN were progressing and that the US government would only take action if the FMLN did not show a willingness to correct its errors.

The US continues to keep an eye on the government and armed forces. In these same declarations, Romero mentioned that the US military aid to El Salvador programmed for July might not be disbursed if the government did not once and for all fulfill the accords still pending, especially the Ad Hoc and Truth Commission recommendations. The US is clear that the bulk of the transformations laid out in the Chapultepec document are the Cristiani government's responsibility and are not yet fulfilled.

And the People?

The more than a month of propaganda aimed at discrediting the FMLN has, to some degree, taken its toll. Those who were always anti FMLN found in the arsenal's discovery a new reason to reject it even further. Those who sympathized with the FMLN during the war have responded to the episode with some desperation. The fact that the FMLN retained arms, even more than violating the accords, weakens the former guerrilla movement's ability to pressure the government for its compliance.

But those most affected by the event are those that the FMLN itself calls "undecided" politically. "The FMLN will have to pay a significant political cost for the discovery of the arms," said Joaquín Villalobos. Facundo Guardado's belittling of the importance of this act of non compliance is a sign of being out of touch with those not already organized in support of the FMLN.

The most delicate issue in the two perspectives existing within the former guerrilla movement regarding the upcoming elections is how to respond to this significant portion of the population that seems apathetic toward the current democratization process. Both the ERP (which proposes that the left move toward the political center) and the FPL (which proposes a leftwing bloc) are trying to attract those Salvadorans who have not as yet joined the struggle to change their nation's history. For this reason, the FMLN should take very seriously the error committed, by recognizing it and providing an explanation to the people. If not, it could be on the road to losing the next elections.

FMLN: Back on Track?

Everything indicates that the five FMLN organizations have finally recognized the incident's seriousness and are beginning to work toward a better understanding among themselves. Will the arsenal's discovery serve to increase the FMLN's maturity? Two things would indicate so: the degree of unity recently demonstrated by the FMLN's national leaders and their position regarding new incidents of government non compliance.

On May 16, at the most critical moment of the FMLN's "division," the FPL was concluding its first national congress. Over 10,000 people overflowed San Salvador's National Gymnasium to proclaim the respective candidacies of Rubén Zamora and Facundo Guardado for President and Vice President of the Republic. The absence of the leaders of the two organizations that comprise the opposing bloc within the FMLN the ERP and RN was very notable. Although the PC and PRTC leaders did not agree with the presidential ticket chosen, they did believe it was best to enter the elections as a leftwing bloc and were thus present.

In mid June, the ERP concluded its own national congress. On that occasion it escaped no one's notice that, this time, the leaders of all five FMLN organizations were present an indication of progress in internal dialogue and understanding.

About that same time, the largest shipment of cocaine in the history of the country and of Central America valued at more than $2 billion Salvadoran colones was seized. The government arrested four "drug traffickers" who, as in other countries, were simply those in charge of guarding the cargo and accused them of being responsible. But everyone knows that moving such enormously valuable contraband in such a tiny country is impossible without the approval, collaboration and/or participation of those who have economic and political power, or of those who control the nation's mechanisms of vigilance. Those people, naturally, remain anonymous and unpunished.

In his closing remarks to the ERP congress, Villalobos stated, "Denying that the FMLN is responsible for the arsenals discovered in Managua is equivalent to denying that the contraband cocaine is linked to the economically powerful in this country." Far from attacking the FPL for hiding arms, as he did in May, he pinpointed the common enemy, again reflecting greater unity within the FMLN.

Yet another indicative sign: On June 27, the FMLN elected its directorate in the district of San Salvador, and "Unity, unity!" was enthusiastically chanted by all the organizations throughout the party's assembly. Shafick Handal later declared that the candidates the FMLN will send to the 1994 elections will be announced shortly, since it is now reaching full consensus on the issue.

The FMLN has now also categorically denounced the government's non compliance regarding the National Civil Police and the naming of Corado. Thus it seems that the guerrilla movement turned political party has revived and again taken up the struggle for fulfillment of the peace accords as the principle platform for its electoral campaign.

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